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772 Michigan Law Review 
CRIMINAL PROCED~EVIDENCE-Composite 
Drawing Not Producible Under Jencks Act-
United States v. Zurita* 
[Vol. 66 
Following a bank robbery, the bank manager and his wife pro-
vided descriptions enabling an agent of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to compose drawings of the robbers which were then 
"approved" by each of these witnesses as being substantially accu-
rate.1 At the defendant's trial four years later, he was identified by 
the manager and his wife as one of the robbers.2 The defendant, in 
an attempt to impeach their testimony,3 requested that the govern-
ment be compelled under the Jencks Act4 to produce the original 
composite drawings.5 The trial court denied this request, stating 
that the production of these drawings was not required by the Act. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, 
affirmed, one judge dissenting. A composite drawing is not a pro-
ducible "statement" within the terms of the Jencks Act. 
The Jencks Act provides that in criminal prosecutions by the 
federal government a court shall, on motion of the defendant, order 
the United States to produce any "statement" of a ·witness which 
relates to the subject matter of his testimony.6 Subsection (e) of the 
Act defines a "statement" as: 
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by him; or 
(2) a stenographic, mechanical or other recording, or a transcription 
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral state-
ment made by said witness to an agent of the Government and re-
corded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.7 
The defendant in the principal case argued that a composite draw-
ing is within the definition, either as a "written statement" adopted 
• 369 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1023 (1967) [hereinafter cited 
as principal case]. 
I. Principal case at 480 (dissenting opinion); see Brief for Appellee in the principal 
case at 12; Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8, 19-21. 
2. Principal case at 480 (dissenting opinion). The four-year delay in identification 
of the defendant magnifies the importance to the defendant of using the drawing as 
a means of testing the witnesses' recollection. 
3. Obviously the defendant thought that the picture might not look anything like 
him. 
4. 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1964). 
5. This Note will deal only with the question of a defendant's right under the 
Jencks Act to inspect a composite drawing. It will not analyze issues related to the 
admissibility of such a drawing or its value as impeachment evidence. However, there 
does not seem to be any evidentiary bar against the use of a drawing for impeachment 
purposes. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1040, at 727 (3d ed. 1940). 
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1964). Since the witnesses in the principal case testified 
regarding the defendant's description, there is no question that the drawing relates to 
subject matter about which the witness testified. See Brief for Appellee in the principal 
case at 12; Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8, 19-21. 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1964). 
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by a witness under clause (I) or as a type of "recording" which is 
substantially a verbatim recital of a witness' oral statement under 
clause (2).8 The Seventh Circuit rejected both interpretations: the 
former because a drawing is not a "·written statement"; the latter 
because a composite drawing necessarily involves an agent's sub-
jective interpretation and thus cannot be considered a verbatim 
recital of the witness' oral statement.9 It is submitted that the court's 
interpretation of clause (I) was not required by existing authority 
and was, as a policy matter, unnecessarily restrictive. 
In Jencks v. United States,10 which led to the passage of the 
Jencks Act, the Supreme Court held that when the federal govern-
ment initiated a criminal prosecution it waived the privilege to 
protect government reports to the extent that such reports were 
relevant to the accused's defense. The waiver extended even to 
reports of confidential nature;11 the only restrictions imposed by the 
Court were that the request for production be for a specific docu-
ment12 which is competent, relevant, and not shielded from discovery 
by any other exclusionary rule.13 Obviously concerned that this hold-
ing might endanger the national security, dry up the government's 
sources of information, and destroy the private character of confiden-
tial documents,14 Congress reacted immediately15 by passing the 
8. See principal case at 475; Petition for Rehearing in the principal case at 2-4. 
For the view that a composite drawing ought to be admissible under clause (2), see 
Note, Composite Drawings Are Not "Statements" Within the Jencks Act, 5 HousroN L. 
REY. 178 (1967). 
9. Principal case at 477. This Note will focus on the propriety of permitting 
production of composite drawings over defendant's motion under clause (1). 
10. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
II. In the Jencks case, the Court stated: 
[T]he Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting 
the defendant go free. The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the 
Government which prosecutes the accused also has the duty to see that justice is 
done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke 
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be 
material to his defense • • • . 
Id. at 671 [quoting from United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1952)]. 
12. 353 U.S. at 667. See generally Orfield, Discovery During Trial in Federal 
Criminal Cases: The Jencks Act, 18 Sw. L.J. 212, 214 (1964) (discussing former federal 
practice); Comment, The Jencks Right: Judicial and Legislative Modifications, the 
States and the Future, 50 VA. L. REv. 535 (1964) (discussing present state practice). 
13. For the purpose of production and inspection, "relevancy" is established when 
the reports are shown to relate to the testimony of the witness. The requirement of 
being outside of any other exclusionary rule indicates that the government might 
still exclude such things as the "work-product" of an agent. The government cannot, 
however, exclude statements by invoking the governmental secrecy privilege. 
14. In his dissenting opinion in Jencks, Justice Clark aroused great public concern 
when he stated: 
Unless the Congress changes the rule announced by the Court today, those 
intelligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as well 
close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and thus 
afforded hini a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential information 
as well as national vital secrets. 
353 U.S. at 681·82 (1957). Upcoming communist spy trials also induced Congress to. 
act promptly in order to eliminate the dilemma of either having to divulge national 
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Jencks Act, which established a procedure designed to secure certain 
discovery rights for defendants in federal criminal trials while at the 
same time preventing needless disclosure of confidential or sensitive 
information.16 If the government contests a defendant's motion for 
production of a witness' prior statement, the Act provides for in 
camera court inspection of the statement and delivery to the defen-
dant of only the parts of the statement deemed related to the par-
ticular witness' testimony.17 Should the government refuse to 
produce any related statement, the Act requires that the court strike 
that witness' testimony or, if justice dictates, declare a mistrial.18 
Although the issue of the applicability of the Act to composite 
drawings was one of first impression,19 the scope of subsection(e)(l) 
has been the subject of litigation. In Palermo v. United States,20 the 
Supreme Court indicated that the word "statement" was not to be 
interpreted broadly21 and upheld a trial court's conclusion that an 
agent's 600-word summary of a three-and-one-half-hour conference 
with a witness was not producible under the terms of the Act.22 The 
secrets or free spies without a trial. See generally S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st 
Sess. app. 7-12 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 7-14 (1957) (includ-
ing statements by Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States; David 
W. Kendall, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; and Abe McGregor Goff of the Post 
Office Dept.). Finally, Congress was concerned about misapplication of the Jencks rule 
because the government had no right to appeal a lower court's dismissal for non-
compliance with a production order. 103 CONG. REc. 15,941 (1957) (remarks of Senator 
O'Mahoney). 
15. H.R. 7915, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), was introduced the day after the Supreme 
Court decision, and was the first of eleven House bills designed to alter the rule of 
the Jencks case. 
16. S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2-4 (1957). 
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1964). Under the Jencks decision the prosecution had to 
turn over to defense counsel all prior statements of witnesses which were logically 
related to their testimony so that counsel could determine whether any of the state-
ments would be useful for impeachment purposes. 
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1964). The Jencks decision had provided for dismissal of 
the case and contempt proceedings for failure to produce statements. See generally 
Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J. 477, 
485-90 (1964); Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in Prospect, 67 YALE L.J. 
674, 697 (1958). 
19. Principal case at 476. 
20. 360 U.S. 343 (1959). The Palermo case is noted in Casenote, Jencks Act Construed 
-Palermo v. United States, 21 Mo. L. REv. 153 (1961); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Due Process and Right of Confrontation-Jencks Act, 58 MICH. L. REv. 888 (1960); 
Comment, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1133, 1134 (1963). 
21. 360 U.S. at 353, 360. See also Comment, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, supra 
note 20, at 1134; Casenote, supra note 20. 
22. 360 U.S. at 353, 360; accord, United States v. Aviles, 337 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 
1964); United States v. Yetman, 196 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D. Conn. 1961). Contra, Papworth 
v. United States, 256 F.2d 125, 129-30 (5th Cir. 1958) (defendant entitled to relevant 
portions of original notebook in which the FBI agent recorded highlights of a con-
versation which, according to the court, were substantially verbatim statements). The 
importance of a ruling as to whether a drawing is within the requirements of the 
Act is emphasized by the fact that the Act is the exclusive remedy for the production 
of a government witness' statement for impeachment purposes. Palermo v. United 
States, 360 U.S. 343, 349, 356, app. A (1959). 
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Court stated that Congress intended to require the production of 
only those documents which contained the witness' own words or 
which could fairly be deemed to reflect fully and without distortion 
what the witness had said.23 Therefore, the Court indicated that 
summaries of a witness' oral statements which evidence a substantial 
selection of material by the agent, which were prepared without the 
aid of complete notes, or which contain an agent's interpretations 
or impressions were not producible.24 
However, four years later, in Campbell v. United States,25 the 
Supreme Court seemed to shift away from this strict interpretation 
of "statement." In Campbell, an agent, upon completion of his in-
terview with a witness, orally repeated the substance of the interview 
and secured the witness' approval of that summary. Seven hours 
later, the agent dictated an "interview report" relying primarily 
upon his notes but also upon memory. The Court upheld the trial 
court's determination that the report was producible under sub-
section (e)(l) of the Act as a written statement adopted by a witness.26 
Thus, a statement not written by the witness himself may neverthe-
less be producible if adopted by him; furthermore, approval of an 
oral statement rather than the writing itself can constitute adop-
tion. 27 
These two cases may be reconcilable if considered in terms of 
appellate deference to trial judges' factual determinations in evi-
dentiary matters; however, the result in Campbell seems to indicate 
a more liberal attitude toward producibility under the Jencks Act. 
Indeed, although the majority in Campbell relied on Palermo as 
definitive of the narrow role of appellate courts in reviewing lower 
court determinations as to producibility, 28 the dissent pointed out 
that the restrictive interpretation of subsection (e)(l) set forth in 
Palermo was undermined by extending that section of the Act to 
include an "investigator's selections, interpretations, and interpola-
tions."29 Nevertheless, the majority made it clear that their main 
23. 360 U.S. at 353 n.11. The court did not feel that the statute, as interpreted, 
raised any constitutional issues, since Congress has the power to prescribe rules of 
procedure for the federal courts. But see notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text. 
24-. 360 U.S. at 352. See generally Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 286, 288-89 
(D.C. Cir. 1964) [listing six factors determining producibility under clause (2)]. 
25. 373 U.S. 487 (1963). See generally Comment, supra note 20, at 1142-46 (1963). 
The Court stated that the Act: " 'implies the duty in the trial judge affirmatively to 
administer the statute in such way as can best secure relevant and available evi-
dence .•• .'" Id. at 493 [quoting from Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 95 
(1961)]. 
26. 373 U.S. at 495. The Court added: "It is settled, of course, that a written state• 
ment, to be producible under § 3500(e)(I), need not be signed by the witness • • • 
or written by him • . . or be a substantially verbatim recording of a prior oral 
statement ••• .'' Id. at 492 n.6. 
27. See id. at 492. 
28. Id. at 493, 495. 
29. Id. at 502 Uustice Clark, dissenting). 
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·concern in interpreting the Act was to effectuate its primary purpose 
-securing fairness for defendants in federal criminal trials.30 
In the principal case, the Seventh Circuit relied primarily on the 
strict interpretation given subsection (e)(l) in Palermo and gave 
only passing notice to the Campbell decision.31 This reliance seems 
misplaced in view of the Supreme Court's apparent shift away from 
the Palermo standard in Campbell. Moreover, there are additional 
arguments for including composite drawings within the definition 
of "written statement" in subsection (e)(l). 
Although composite drawings are not literally written statements, 
they are in effect only an alternative means of recording the descrip-
tive statement of a witness. By using modern techniques and compe-
tent personnel, law enforcement officials can create drawings which 
accurately record descriptive statements.32 In fact, a composite draw-
ing may provide a more meaningful collation of the various aspects 
of the witness' description of the suspect's physical appearance than 
could a verbatim written report, 33 which would be producible even 
under Palermo. That such drawings subject the witness' statement 
to the interpretations of the artist-agent should no longer preclude 
their production. Despite language to the contrary in Palermo,34 
the agent's interview report in Campbell was held producible even 
30. Id. at 496-97. 
31. See principal case at 477. The conflict between Palermo and Campbell may be 
due to differences in the quality of the summaries involved, and thus this could provide 
a basis for reconciling the cases. Some support for this view is contained in the 
Campbell court's statement that a district judge is entitled to believe that an agent of 
the FBI "of some fifteen years of experience would record a potential witness' state-
ment with sufficient accuracy." Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 495 (1963). 
32. Such drawings normally are created by using "image makers" and artists. It 
is common practice not to show the witness the composite until it is finished. At this 
time, corrections are made; if there is more than one witness, each of them is shown the 
drawing and given an opportunity to correct it until each is satisfied. The best results 
are achieved when (1) there is a good artist or machine operator who can respond 
correctly to the witnesses' descriptions; (2) a witness has seen the criminal for a 
significant length of time; and (3) good communication exists between witness and 
artist or operator. In addition to obtaining a general verbal description, there is an 
attempt to obtain peculiar features of the criminal. Thus, the hairline, type of nose, 
scars, etc. are stressed as most relevant. Telephone interview with Inspector Theodore 
Sienski, Robbery, "B. & E." Bureau, City of Detroit Police Department, November 13, 
1967. 
33. While no cases have previously dealt with the production of drawings under 
the Jencks Act, a drawing does seem to satisfy the requirements of being a "state-
ment" in other contexts. See generally United States v. Molin, 244 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 
(D. Mass. 1965) (holding that a "statement" can take any form, including any kind of 
appropriate marking which would be understood by the person looking at it); Bailey 
v. State, 365 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963) (treating a photograph as a 
statement or document). A narrow construction of "statement" under the Act would 
appear to result in numerous loopholes by which the government could avoid dis-
covery, yet still preserve the meaning of what was said. Everett, supra note 18, at 516; 
Comment, supra note 20, at 891, 901; Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of 
the Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 595, 612 (1960). See also 
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 361-63, 365 (1959) (concurring opinion). 
34. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
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though its preparation had involved selection of portions of the 
witness' statement and was to that extent an "interpretation." 
In addition, the court in the principal case stated that the pur-
pose of subsection (e) of the Act is to insure "substantial fidelity of 
recordation or reproduction" of the ·witness' statements.35 If a wit-
ness "adopts" a composite drawing upon its completion, as did the 
witnesses in the principal case, the "substantial fidelity" of the re-
cordation would seem to be established.36 Therefore, an interpreta-
tion of subsection (e) which would include composite drawings 
within the term "written statement" would not thwart the purpose 
of the subsection. 
Furthermore, compelling production of such drawings would not 
frustrate the Jencks Act's broader purpose of permitting discovery 
of relevant statements37 while foreclosing unnecessary disclosures of 
confidential information and potentially harmful fishing expeditions 
through government files.38 In the principal case, the drawing was 
totally unrelated to national security and its production would not 
have been harmful to the public interest.39 More important, the 
35. Principal case at 477. 
36. The witness in the principal case approved of the pictures as being substantially 
similar to the robber's appearance. Brief for Appellant in the principal case at 3-5, 8. 
37. 103 CONG. REc. 15,782 (remarks of Senator Ervin), 15,783 (remarks of Senator 
O'Mahoney), 16,123 (remarks of Representatives O'Hara and Metcalf), 16,489 (remarks 
of Senator Cooper) (1957). But cf. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957); 
H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1957); Comment, supra note 20, at 901; 
Comment, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297, 313 (1959). See also 
103 CONG. REc. 15,921 (remarks of Senator Dirksen), 16,739 (remarks of Representative 
Keating) (1957). 
38. The bill was to set standards of interpretation "(l) for safeguarding the needless 
disclosure of confidential information in government files and at the same time (2) 
assuring defendants access to the material in those files which is pertinent to the 
testimony of government witnesses." H.R. REP. No. 700, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957). 
39. Moreover, the rush to get essential protective legislation passed before Congress 
adjourned, the mentioning of a possible need for language revision in following sessions, 
and the expression of lack of sufficient time for comprehensive thought and con-
sideration, provide some support for the view that the courts should construe the 
statutory language broadly. 103 CoNG. REc. 14,913 (remarks of Senator Clark), 16,113-14 
(remarks of Representative Curtis) (1957); Keefe, Jinks and Jencks, a Study of Jencks 
(remarks of Senator O'Mahoney), 16,124 (remarks of Representative Coffin), 16,742 
(remarks of Representative Curtis) (1957); Keefe, Jinks and Jencks, a Study of Jencks 
Versus United States in Depth, 7 CATIIouc U.L. REv. 91, 94 (1958). Final formation of 
subsection (e) of the Act occurred during a Joint Conference only two days prior to 
passage of the Act and to adjournment of Congress. 
The Joint Conference was agreed to on August 27, 1957, and the bill was passed 
by the Senate on August 29, 1957. 103 CONG. REc. 16,083, 16,488 (remarks of Senators 
Mundt and Clark) 16,489-90 (1957). The fact the senators relied on the broad inter-
pretation of the Act presented by Senator O'Mahoney, a sponsor of the legislation and 
a Senate conferee, is further reason to construe the word "statement" broadly. 103 CoNG. 
REC. 16,489 (remarks of Senators Clark & O'Mahoney) (1957). Senator O'Mahoney, in 
answering a question regarding a requirement that certain photostats of records or of 
pictures be submitted for examination by the defendant or his counsel, stated: "If 
the pictures have anything to do with the statement of the witness-with either the 
written statement or the oral statement-of course that would be part of it; but 
whatever is produced must be related to the evidence of the witness who has testified 
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defendant's request was for production of a single document and 
thus could not be characterized as a fishing expedition. 
In relation to the latter point, the court in the principal case 
seemed to rely improperly on Ahlstedt v. United States.40 In that 
case the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied defendant's 
motion for production of a large number of photographs which had 
been shown to witnesses in an attempt to identify the participants 
in a robbery.41 However, this denial did not seem to be based on the 
fact that photographs rather than written statements were involved. 
The court in Ahlstedt based its decision primarily on the notion that 
it was preventing a fishing expedition through the prosecutor's "en-
tire investigative files." Ahlstedt is thus not direct authority for 
banning discovery of pictures under the Jencks Act. Indeed, it can 
be inferred from the opinion that if the defendant's request had 
been for a specific photograph it would have been granted.42 Admit-
tedly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently refused 
to adopt such an inference. In United States v. Garrett,43 the Seventh 
Circuit cited Ahlstedt as authority for its denial of defendant's 
motion to produce one photograph which had been shown to wit-
nesses for identification purposes. However, the Garrett opinion 
indicates that the witnesses had never "adopted" the photograph, 
and this factor alone could have been a reason for precluding its 
production under subsection (e)(l).44 Therefore, Garrett may be 
distinguished from the principal case and should not foreclose a 
favorable ruling on a motion for production of a composite drawing 
which has been adopted by a witness. 
Finally, there are some indications that a narrow interpretation 
of subsection (e)(l) of the Act may raise constitutional problems. 
Although the Jencks case itself was based on the Supreme Court's 
power to act in matters of procedure,45 some recent cases suggest 
that denial of a defendant's request for evidence material to his 
defense violates due process. In Brady v. Maryland,46 the Supreme 
before the court in the criminal case." Following Senator O'Mahoney's remarks, the 
Act was passed in the Senate by a vote of seventy-four to two. 103 CONG. REc. 16,489-90 
(1957). 
40. 325 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1963). 
41. Id. at 259. 
42. After noting that the defendant's motion sought to compel production of all 
relevant documents and photographs used in the investigation, the court went on to 
state that, "the District Court ruled, and we think correctly, that the Jencks Statute 
does not apply to miscellaneous photographs." Id. at 259 (emphasis added). 
43. 371 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1966). 
44. Id. at 300. 
45. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957). See also Comment, supra 
note 20, at 898-903 (1960); Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the 
Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 595 (1960). 
46. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 291 (1966); 
Wexler, The Constitutional Disclosure Duty and the Jencks Act, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. R.Ev. 
206, 209 (1966). 
Recent Developments
Court stated generally "that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution." 47 More
specifically, the four concurring justices in Palermo suggested that
a restricted interpretation of the Jencks Act could possibly give rise
to a sixth amendment right of confrontation issue.48 They posed the
case in which a defendant is kept from inspecting criminal evidence
because it does not "meet the definition of statement in subsection
(e) of the statute."49
These potential constitutional overtones provide additional sup-
port for a broad interpretation of "written statement" in subsection
(e)(1) of the Jencks Act. A broad construction, in addition to avoid-
ing potential constitutional issues,50 would seem to be consistent
with recent authority on the scope of subsection (e)(1) and in accord
with the purposes of the Jencks Act. If a request for production is
confined to specific composite drawings and the fidelity of the re-
cordation is established by a witness' "adoption," the drawings
should be producible.
47. 373 U.S. at 87.
48. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362 (1959) (concurring opinion). See
generally Everett, supra note 18, at 516; Wexler, supra note 46, at 411; Comment,
supra note 20, at 891, 893; Comment, The Jencks Legislation: The Status of the
Accused's Federal Discovery Rights, 38 TExAs L. Rav. 595, 612 (1960).
49. 360 U.S. at 362.
50. Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
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